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Abstract: Convergence is a multi-facetted phenomenon affecting the technological 
basis of information and communication industries, the boundaries of existing and 
new markets, and the organization of service providers. Convergence in substitutes 
will tend to increase the intensity of competition but convergence in complements 
may have the opposite effect. Given the economics of advanced communication 
industries, convergence necessitates strategies to overcome the risk of 
commodification at the level of networks, applications, and services. The paper 
examines bundling, differentiation, alliances, and merger strategies adopted by North 
American service providers in response to convergence. Service providers' 
opportunities and risks in the emerging environment differ considerably, with cable 
and telephone service providers presently in stronger positions than wireless service 
providers, broadcasters, and satellite service providers. New entrants such as 
Vonage, Skype, Google, and Yahoo have high disruptive potential but remain 
disadvantaged without their own access networks. 
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hroughout history, rapid technological change has captivated people's 
imagination, often at the expense of a more detached analysis of the 
forces at work and their effects. Pundits have erred both by 
underestimating and overestimating the impact of technical and economic 
change: the market potential of mobile phones was grossly underrated, while 
expectations of integrated broadband communication have fallen short of 
actual adoption and use since the 1970s. The convergence debate is no 
exception. Whereas the term is widely used, its exact meaning is poorly 
defined and its consequences are rarely explored in-depth. Yet it continues 
to serve as a powerful shared vision, framing debates on the future of the 
communications industries and influencing management and policy 
                     
(*) The author would like to thank Zhang Jun for his diligent research assistance. 
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decisions. This is not to say that the notion of convergence is futile: 
instances of convergence abound and are one important factor in the 
reorganization and transformation of the communication industries. 
However, other forces are at work as well and convergence unfolds in ways 
that are more complicated and with effects that are more multilayered than 
commonly recognized. 
One of the core claims of this paper is that convergence is a reality, but 
that it has limitations as an overarching concept with which to grasp current 
transformations in the communication industries. Firstly, the term 
convergence suggests that existing phenomena blend into each other and 
become more alike. It conceptualizes the future in terms of the past 
organization of industry and thus has an inherently backward orientation. It 
consequently distracts from the fact that digitization enables entirely new 
services, which may embed components of previous services but are 
typically more than a recombination of them. Secondly, it emphasizes the 
centripetal forces leading toward a more integrated communication sector, 
but tends to ignore the centrifugal forces that contribute to divergence and 
differentiation within the sector. Thirdly, much of the literature on 
convergence seems to tacitly assume that technical convergence implies an 
integration of markets and firms (and subsequently necessitates a 
convergence of law and policy). Whereas some forces work in that direction, 
these effects are far from inevitable. Fourthly, with few exceptions 
(GREENSTEIN & KHANNA, 1997, for example), the literature fails to embed 
convergence in a broader economic theory of networks and service 
provision. Such a closer look would reveal that one of the main conclusions 
of much of the convergence literature – that convergence intensifies 
competition – only holds under certain conditions and that there are some 
forms of convergence and corporate responses that weaken it. Lastly, 
convergence is often seen as an external, technically driven phenomenon to 
which firms can only adapt. In practice, it is the outcome of a co-evolution of 
technical change, active business strategies to shape markets, user choices 
and policy decisions. 
This short paper cannot do justice to all these issues. Rather, it has to 
focus on a few select questions. The next section develops a typology of 
convergence processes. The third section of the paper discusses the 
economics of convergence and divergence and their implications for 
competitive strategy. Prototypes of responses to convergence are reviewed 
in the fourth, fifth and sixth sections, which are followed by some 
conclusions and perspectives for the future. 
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  The anatomy of convergence 
In communications, the term convergence was apparently first used in 
the late 1970s and early 1980s. From a technological perspective, Nicholas 
Negroponte at MIT and John Scully at Apple Computers envisioned a more 
integrated future for computing, telecommunications and the services based 
on these technologies 1. The term was popularized by Ithiel de Sola Pool, 
who predicted a: "convergence of modes" in his 1983 book Technologies of 
Freedom that would integrate all communications into one grand system 
(POOL, 1983). His concern was predominantly the danger that forms of 
government control established for over-the-air broadcasting (and not the 
free press model) would gradually be expanded to cover these emerging 
technologies and limit their inherent ability to support free speech. Despite 
these different approaches, these early pundits share the key observation 
that digital technology enables the representation of different types of 
information (voice, data, audio and video) in a more unified way. Combined 
with the increased processing power of microchips, the rapidly expanding 
transmission capacity of fiber optic networks and more sophisticated forms 
of compression, progressive integration in a multimedia industry seemed all 
but inevitable. At the same time, the number of service providers was to 
multiply and intensify competition throughout the sector. 
This view became widely accepted and was further elaborated during the 
1990s. BALDWIN, McVOY & STEINFELD (1996) remains the most 
comprehensive overview of the many facets of convergence. Convergence 
is explored in its technological, business and policy aspects. Despite many 
caveats and critical distance to possible future scenarios, the authors 
anticipate the emergence of integrated broadband networks and eventually 
full-service networks, accompanied by acceleration in competition among 
the main players. LATZER (1997, especially pp. 60-84) differentiates 
between two phases of convergence. Beginning in the 1960s, 
telecommunications and data communications started to converge, a 
development for which NORA & MINC (1980) coined the term "telematics." 
Since the 1980s, a second phase of convergence between mass media with 
the telematics sector is identified, a phenomenon labelled by LATZER 
                     
1 The term has a longer track record in mathematics (as referring to the convergence of 
mathematical series, for instance) and in development economics (as referring to the 
convergence of economic performance data) (GORDON, 2003). More recently, the term was 
used to refer to the narrowing of performance gaps between industrialized nations (KOSKI & 
MAJUMDAR, 2000). 
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(1997) as "mediamatics." According to Latzer, the transition to mediamatics 
affects the networks, functions and corporate organization of 
communications. van DIJK (1999, p. 9) also distinguishes these two waves 
of convergence, but identifies five layers at which integration takes place: 
infrastructure, transportation, management, services and types of data. 
Similarly, NOAM (2000) draws a distinction between convergence of delivery 
technologies, business convergence, regulatory convergence and 
convergence between telecommunications and the internet. 
Building on these predecessors and on BAUER, WEIJNEN, TURK & 
HERDER (2003), this paper distinguishes between technological, market 
and organizational convergence (regulatory convergence will not be 
discussed in detail). Although there is no universally agreed definition of the 
term "convergence," it is most frequently used to refer to a blurring of the 
boundaries and/or a reduction of the differences between firms or industries. 
This blurring can occur in varying degrees, ranging from a partial overlap to 
a full elimination of differences and thus a fusion of formerly separate 
sectors. GERADIN (2001) refers to the former as "loose convergence" and 
to the latter as "deep convergence." An example of partial convergence is 
powerline communications, in which electricity wires are used to configure a 
platform for communications. Should powerline communications succeed, 
electric utilities would overlap with communications service providers in part 
of their operations, but the two sectors would not fully integrate. An example 
of deep convergence (or fusion) would be the emergence of fully integrated 
multimedia service providers, supplying their customers via integrated 
broadband communications platforms. Furthermore, convergence may be 
symmetric (two or more formerly separate industries penetrate each other's 
domain) or asymmetric (one industry expanding into the domain of the other, 
but not vice versa, as in the case of powerline communications). 
Technological convergence refers to developments affecting the 
technological basis of communications at the level of networks, applications 
and services. The three most important trends are digitization, increased 
processor speed and the migration to higher transmission capacity. At the 
level of networks, migration to a general-purpose platform may unfold in two 
prototypical ways (as well as hybrids): network upgrades and new 
deployments. Examples of the first approach are enhancements of one-way 
cable delivery networks to two-way interactive capability; narrowband voice 
network to DSL platforms; 2G and 2.5G mobile to 3G networks; and electric 
distribution wires to powerline communications. Examples of the second 
approach are the deployment of fiber networks or of broadband wireless 
networks. Which path will be pursued depends on the revenue opportunities 
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generated by new platforms and the relative costs of upgrades as compared 
to the costs of new deployments. Despite digitization and a migration to 
higher bandwidths, important differences with regard important functional 
characteristics (such as mobility, reliability and security) remain between 
technologies. Moreover, given the high costs of new network deployments, 
limits on the ability to upgrade the existing infrastructure 2, and the different 
cost structures of platforms, a hybrid path will be pursued by most service 
providers. For example, SBC deploys fiber to the premises (FTTP) in 
greenfield developments, but fiber to the neighbourhood (FTTN) combined 
with VDSL in established service areas. Similarly, Bell South extends the 
reach of its DSL network with WiMax. Currently, these heterogeneous 
components are partially integrated by a logical architecture, most 
importantly the ubiquitous TCP/IP protocol. However, embedded are a 
variety of proprietary network architectures such as the cable systems' 
reliance on DOCSIS protocol. 
In addition to these technological aspects, economic forces, such as the 
need to price discriminate to recover the high fixed costs of network 
investment (discussed in greater detail in the following section) will work 
towards more differentiated network platforms. Moreover, as more 
competitors become involved in the development of applications and 
services, the technological basis at the higher layers of the network stack 
becomes more differentiated. There is already a broad sense among 
applications and service providers that a higher degree of standardization 
would be desirable. With the gradual emergence of the next generation of 
internet protocols, one can expect a lengthy transition period in which both 
IPv4 and IPv6 will coexist. It consequently seems likely that the future 
network infrastructure will be even more heterogeneous and differentiated. 
Whereas these platforms will provide a broad range of similar functionalities, 
each will also provide specialized functions not available from any other 
platform. Areas of differentiation will include the degree of mobility supported 
by a platform (full mobility, nomadic, stationary); network security; 
throughput; resilience; quality of service and price. From a technological 
perspective, forces of convergence are thus counteracted by important 
opposite forces that are most likely to result in a differentiated technical 
infrastructure. 
                     
2 Verizon estimates that only 80% of its access lines can be economically upgraded to DSL 
capability. 
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The emergence of general purpose technologies affects the boundaries 
of existing markets and industries, possibly leading to market convergence. 
It will also enable the creation of entirely new markets and perhaps 
industries. GREENSTEIN & KHANNA (1997) recognized that convergence 
may affect the substitutability or the complementarity relations between 
products and services. The degree of substitutability between products 
spans a continuum from zero (independent products) to strong (close 
substitutes). "Convergence in substitutes" implies that products or services 
become more interchangeable from a user perspective (GREENSTEIN & 
KHANNA, 1997). For example, news delivered via the internet may become 
a closer substitute for news delivered via radio, television or newspapers. 
Wireless telephone services may become a stronger substitute for fixed 
telephone service. Other things equal, convergence in substitutes expands 
the choice options of users and therefore tends to increase the intensity of 
competition. Convergence in substitutes may create incentives for firms to 
adopt defensive strategies, such as the bundling of services or even 
mergers to reduce its competition-enhancing effects. 
"Convergence in complements" occurs if two or more products or 
services work better together than they used to (GREENSTEIN & KHANNA, 
1997). It occurs if firms develop products or subsystems within a standard 
bundle of features that can work together to form a larger system. For 
example, to be a successful provider of multimedia services, it may be 
necessary to combine networking, computer and design expertise. As such 
diverse expertise may be spread across several organizations, convergence 
in complements may create strong incentives for collaboration in alliances, 
joint ventures or even mergers. Other things equal, the intensity of 
competition within the cluster of complementary products may consequently 
be reduced. Convergence in complements may therefore require balancing 
the benefits from collaboration with the potential losses from reduced 
competition. 
Organizational convergence can be defined as the integration of 
functions formerly accomplished in separate firms into one enterprise. It can 
take many forms. For example, the emergence of multi-media companies 
through vertical and horizontal expansion into adjacent markets could be 
considered one form of organizational convergence. Alliances, network firms 
as well as mergers and acquisitions, are other forms of organizational 
convergence. COASE (1937), WILLIAMSON (1975) and others in the 
tradition of transaction cost economics have shown that the boundaries of a 
firm are strongly influenced by the relative cost of conducting transactions 
via a market, as opposed to internalizing an activity within the firm. 
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Organizational convergence could thus also be defined as an integration of 
functions due to cost changes in the production processes employed by the 
industry and individual firms. The ongoing technological and economic 
change in information and communication industries affects their economies 
of scale, economies of scope, and economics of aggregation (BAKOS & 
BRYNJOLFSSON, 2000). From an efficiency perspective, one would expect 
organizational convergence in areas where such economies are strong and 
transaction costs of contracting in open markets are high. In contrast to such 
"active" organizational convergence, it may also be motivated as a strategy 
to defend existing market positions, in which case the efficiency impact may 
be limited or even negative. 
  The economics of convergence 
As the discussion in the previous section illustrated, convergence is only 
one trajectory of the evolution of advanced communication systems. It is 
accompanied by parallel processes of differentiation and divergence. 
Moreover, entirely new platforms, applications and services emerge, such as 
peer-to-peer networking, wireless ad hoc networks or blogs that are enabled 
by advanced networks, but are not necessarily a "convergence 
phenomenon." Although multiple technological, corporate-strategic and 
political forces are at work and the outcomes are difficult to predict, it is 
possible to identify the important economic principles that shape them. From 
an economic vantage point, technological convergence can be seen as the 
emergence of a general-purpose technology (BRESNAHAN & 
TRAJTENBERG, 1995). Market and organizational convergence are 
influenced by these changes in the technological basis. An understanding of 
strategies in response to convergence therefore has to begin with the 
economics of convergence. 
Digital network platforms, applications and services share the common 
characteristic of high upfront (possibly sunk) costs and relatively low, and, in 
extreme cases, even zero, incremental costs. However, their cost structures, 
particularly the magnitude and relative importance of fixed and variable cost, 
differ. For example, wireless broadband networks require lower initial capital 
outlays, but typically have higher variable operations and maintenance 
costs. Upgrades of analog cable networks to digital interactive platforms or 
upgrades of narrowband voice networks to DSL capability require more 
modest investments per home than the deployment of fiber-to-the-
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neighbourhood (FTTN), fiber-to-the-curb (FTTC) or fiber-to-the-premises 
(FTTP), the most expensive solution. In metropolitan areas, upgrades of 
existing networks may be carried out at an investment expense of USD 250-
500 per home, while greenfield fiber solutions may cost up to USD 2,500 per 
home 3. It is helpful to conceptualize network rollout as a two-stage decision: 
during the first stage service providers determine the coverage and capacity 
of the network; during the second stage, once the investment is sunk, they 
will compete for customers using price and non-price instruments. As the 
total capital outlay and installation costs are dependent, among other 
factors, on the number of homes connected, network deployment costs are a 
combination of fixed and variable components. However, once the network 
is in place, with regard to the provision of services using the platform, the 
costs of the network are fixed (and largely sunk). The different cost 
structures of alternative network platforms will place limits on the degree of 
technical convergence. It is therefore likely that the future network will 
remain heterogeneous with large areas that are seamlessly integrated, but 
others that are not. 
At the level of content production, costs are likewise characterized by 
high upfront and sunk cost. A motion picture, a television show, a news 
internet site or a database all require sinking funds before the product or 
service can be sold. Once created, the incremental costs of copying and 
distribution – via CD, DVD, broadcasting, cable, or the internet – are typically 
low. However, the cost structure also depends on the vertical organization of 
the industry. The above scenario directly applies for a vertically integrated 
company with a presence in production and distribution. Companies 
operating only at the distribution stage have to acquire content. If content is 
bought at a fixed price, the sunk cost scenario applies. However, in some 
forms of distribution, for example, internet streaming, royalties, which 
constitute a major portion of the expenses, are based on the number of 
streams and hence are a variable cost of production. In the first case, the 
sunken nature of the cost creates strong economic pressures to maximize 
sales and/or audience sizes; in the latter cases, the economic pressure to be 
big and take advantage of economies of scale is lower. 
As the capacity of the networks in place expands and an increasing 
number of platforms are principally able to provide digital services, large 
                     
3 Corning, a major fiber manufacturer, has published figures stating that, due to technical 
innovations and price declines for components, new fiber networks could be deployed for as low 
as USD 1,200 per home connected. See USTA "FTTH: Market Drivers, Economics, and 
Technologies and Deployments", July 12, 2005, p. 19. 
J.M. BAUER 67 
segments of the market for information transportation may start to resemble 
commodity markets with low profit margins. It has become a widely shared 
view that higher value-added, and hence profit opportunities, will be 
associated with applications and services (or in general activities at higher 
levels of the network stack). Whereas this may be true in some market 
segments, in others similar tendencies towards commodification may apply. 
For example, access-independent VoIP service, such as Skype or Google 
Talk, will not only create enormous pressure on the existing telephony 
business model that charges by the minute, but may also undermine other 
VoIP service providers such as Vonage. In areas where profit margins will 
be eroded quickly, a mismatch between the cost structure and profit 
opportunities of the industry is created. Combinations of high sunk costs and 
low profit opportunities are not stable and will necessitate adjustments by the 
service providers 4. Two principal strategies are available: (1) a 
differentiation of the network, application and service layers to avoid 
commodification, or (2) partial or full vertical integration between network 
and content layers (or at least the formation of alliances between firms at 
these levels). 
A differentiation strategy may be implemented in many ways. Network 
service providers may offer different qualities of service at different prices. 
For example, at the retail level, broadband access providers offer higher 
access speeds at higher prices. They often also limit the amount of data that 
may be downloaded per month in any given price bracket. At the wholesale 
level, different service level agreements at varying prices are available as 
well. Fiber network operators like Verizon offer open wholesale and retail 
platforms in addition to closed platforms. For example, consumers may buy 
bundled video, internet, and voice service from Verizon, which will be 
provided via a closed platform. They may elect to only buy a broadband 
access platform and contract for IPTV service independently. Moreover, 
technical convergence does not imply that advanced networks will have 
clearly defined horizontal layers. Service providers like Akamai invest in 
overlay networks that defy the supposed horizontal layered structure of the 
internet (CLARK, 2005). A vertical integration strategy attempts to reduce 
the risk of commodification by creating a presence in supposedly high value-
added application and service layers. However, it is not straightforward and 
network service providers many not have all the core competencies required 
to pursue a successful vertical integration strategy. Both strategies, as well 
                     
4 This is different from the past, where high costs at the network and applications level were 
typically matched by high added-value at that level. 
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as hybrids combining both approaches, are being pursued by U.S. 
companies, as discussed in more detail in the next section. 
Convergence also affects market entry barriers, although the net effects 
are difficult to anticipate. It is useful to distinguish between its effect on 
exogenous and endogenous entry barriers. Exogenous entry barriers are 
beyond the control of firms in the market. Convergence may increase some 
exogenous barriers, but reduce others. For example, if technical 
convergence results in increased economies of scale and scope, it will, other 
things equal, increase entry barriers, as fewer facilities-based access 
providers may be able to survive in the market. However, if the extent of 
such economies relative to the market remains limited, convergence may 
reduce market entry barriers, especially for applications and service 
providers who may be able to choose from competing network platforms. In 
a fully digital environment, network service providers have many 
opportunities and incentives to differentiate their services to create 
endogenous market entry barriers, especially if they are not subject to any 
non-discrimination requirements as is the case for broadband in the U.S. At 
the same time, network operators have incentives to make their platform 
available to third parties to internalize some of the complementary 
externalities created by applications and service providers (FARRELL & 
WEISER, 2003). The incentives of platform owners to grant access to third 
parties may be further enhanced once the initial costs are sunk. The net 
effect of these contrary forces is not fully understood in practice and it will 
remain to be seen whether the self-interest of network owners and antitrust 
will be effective in preventing abuse of such strategies. 
All these developments suggest that the economics of advanced 
networks are much more complicated than anticipated in early models that 
predicted convergence to full-service networks. The relative ability of existing 
and new service providers to take advantage of the new opportunities 
enabled by convergence varies greatly. For example, cable companies enjoy 
an advantage in bundling services over telephone companies, who 
eventually will have to upgrade to some form of fiber optic network 
infrastructure to effectively deliver video entertainment services, for which 
ADSL is not fast enough. Similarly, whereas wireless service providers will 
enjoy competitive advantages due to their mobility, they will face major 
difficulties in delivering high-quality entertainment services, unless big 
breakthroughs occur. Terrestrial broadcasters and satellite service providers 
have large and relatively stable audiences, but face enormous hurdles in 
upgrading their analog infrastructure. Even with an all-digital infrastructure, 
their ability to offer a broad range of services is more limited than that of 
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other facilities-based service providers. Overall, it is likely that all these 
technological and economic factors will generate a heterogeneous network 
infrastructure with associated differentiated applications and services. The 
next sections look at corporate strategies in response to convergence and to 
actively shape the emerging market environment. 
  Bundling 
The bundling of services allows service providers to reduce variability in 
the willingness to pay for individual services and at the same time increase 
their revenues (SHAPIRO & VARIAN, 1999). For example, assume that 
consumer A is willing to pay USD 60 per month for cable TV and USD 30 for 
voice services. Furthermore, suppose that consumer B is willing to pay 
USD 80 for cable TV, but only USD 5 for voice service (perhaps because 
he/she is using VoIP). If the service provider charged USD 85 it could sell 
cable TV and voice service to both consumers, for total revenues of 
USD 170. Other pricing strategies would yield lower total revenues 5. If 
consumers have more complicated preference structures, as is likely, more 
differentiated mixed bundling strategies can be adopted with similar effects. 
For consumers, bundling may reduce the overall outlay for services 
compared to stand-along purchases, but the one-stop shopping model may 
also create benefits due to reduced transaction costs (such as one bill for 
one service provider). Ideally, bundling has beneficial effects for suppliers 
and users. In the economic environment described in the previous sections, 
the bundling of services fulfils important additional strategic functions. It 
allows service providers to shield themselves, at least to a certain degree, 
against market entry by nimble competitors in one market segment, such as 
access-independent VoIP service providers. In a broadband environment, 
companies like Vonage or Skype could enter the market with relatively 
modest customer acquisition costs and only minimal facility investment. 
However, if an incumbent is able to bundle voice services with services – 
such as entertainment or internet access – that the potential entrant in a 
single segment cannot supply, it may be able to offer the contested service 
at a low, perhaps even zero, price within the bundle 6. This will drastically 
                     
5 For example a price for cable TV of USD 60 and for phone services of USD 30 would yield 
USD 150; a price for cable of USD 80 and for voice of USD 10 would yield USD 90. 
6 Firms offering components of a bundle at low prices will have to avoid antitrust action. There 
are no clear rules with regard to bundling. Courts seem to have considered discounts in excess 
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reduce the market entry opportunities of potential new entrants that only 
compete in one market segment. More generally, bundling of services will 
create entry barriers for companies that are present in fewer market 
segment than the incumbent (NALEBUFF, 2004) and will thus, other things 
equal, reduce the intensity of competition. 
Until recently, incumbent service providers in the U.S. were typically 
constrained from bundling monopolistic with competitive services due to 
concerns about predatory behaviour. For example, after the U.S. 
Telecommunications Act of 1996 ("Act"), the Regional Bell Operating 
Companies (RBOCs) could not offer integrated bundles of local and long 
distance services in their own service territories until they met the conditions 
established in the 14-point checklist of section 271 of the Act. Likewise, 
although all of them had wireless subsidiaries, RBOCs could not offer 
bundles of wireline and wireless services until recently. It took until 
December 2003 for the RBOCs to receive approval to offer long distance 
services within their own service territories 7. However, interexchange 
carriers and cable companies were freed by the Act to compete in local 
markets. AT&T's "One Rate" plan and MCI's "Neighborhood" plan were first 
examples of bundled local and long distance service. By 2002, bundled local 
and long distance service was the most popular integrated offering. As their 
restrictions were eliminated, RBOCs started to offer integrated local and long 
distance service packages as well. In July 2002, Bell South introduced 
bundles (branded "Answers") that included local and long-distance 
telephone service, internet access and wireless services (via the joint SBC-
Bell South subsidiary Cingular). In August of the same year, Verizon 
introduced a similar offer, branded "Veriations All". Both services included 
one integrated bill and discounts from the unbundled price (BRIER & GAGE, 
2002). Cable companies such as TCI had experimentally offered telephone 
services as early as 1994 and internet access shortly thereafter. Cable 
modem access started to grow more rapidly in the late 1990s, but cable 
telephone service offerings grew only slowly. With the broader appeal of 
VoIP, cable voice services are now growing faster. As of December 31st, 
2004, 3.7 million access lines were served by cable companies, equalling 
44% of all lines provided by facilities-based carriers (but only 2% of all local 
access lines, FCC 2005, p. 3). The introduction of national calling plans by 
                     
of 10% of the variable cost as anticompetitive (BIANCO, 2004). However, given the low 
incremental cost of voice services provided on broadband networks, network owners could 
probably defend a low price. 
7 See: http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Common_Carrier/in-region_applications/[October 15, 2005]. 
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wireless service providers (also led by AT&T's move to introduce "buckets" 
of minutes with its "Digital One Rate" plan in 1998) and the pricing plans by 
VoIP service providers also reflect the integration of local and long distance 
service pricing. 
Within a short time, triple-play (fixed voice, video and internet access) 
and quadruple-play (fixed voice, wireless, video and internet access) 
offerings have emerged as the consensual vision for the future of the 
industry. Interestingly, the early pioneers in this area were rural local 
exchange carriers (RLECs). Some pundits estimate that several hundred 
RLECs are presently offering bundled services. RLECs are small 
companies, often with fewer than 5,000 customers, but many of them can 
take advantage of their close customer relations, familiarity with local 
conditions, and a trusted brand name. For example, Paul Bunyan Rural 
Telephone Cooperative in Bemidji, Minnesota offers six service packages 
that combine in different bundles local phone service (long-distance is 
offered separately at flat rates), internet access, and digital television 
service, at discounts ranging from USD 2.95 to USD 26.13 8. Another small 
rural telephone company, Ringgold Telephone Co. in Ringgold, Georgia, 
introduced a television service in 2001. It does not offer bundled packages at 
discounted prices, but provides the full range of voice, data and video 
services 9. One challenge for small RLECs is the licensing of programming. 
Their business association, the National Telecommunications Cooperative 
Association (NCTA) serves as an intermediary to license programs. 
During the past two years, the leading cable and telephone companies in 
the U.S. and Canada have moved aggressively to introduce various bundled 
packages. The starting positions of the two main players (cable and 
telephone companies) are not equal. With a broadband distribution networks 
in place and fewer regulatory constraints, cable companies have an 
advantage in the market for bundled entertainment services. Their main 
revenue drivers are entertainment and broadband internet access. Voice 
service is often added at a discounted price to enhance the incentives to buy 
bundled packages. However, cable companies face disadvantages in 
offering mobile services. As of October 2005, only Rogers Communications 
in Canada has expanded into mobile service offerings. (There are also 
rumours that Comcast might acquire T-Mobile in the U.S. and/or form an 
MVNO agreement with Sprint Nextel.) Incumbent telephone companies 
                     
8 See http://www.paulbunyan.net/index.html (last visited October 16th, 2005). 
9 See http://www.rtctel.com/ (last visited October 16th, 2005). 
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(ILECs) were not able to offer video services without significant network 
upgrades. In the USA, Verizon Communications elected to invest in FTTP, 
although this implies a higher investment cost and probably a slower rollout 
process than the hybrid strategies (FTTN, FTTC) pursued by other 
incumbents SBC ("Project LightSpeed") and Bell South. Verizon has 
introduced FiOS, a higher-speed internet access service, providing 
download speeds of 5, 15, or 30 Mbps in selected communities (such as 
Keller, Texas). 
Table 1 summarizes selected features of triple-play and quadruple-play 
plans. Prices, service offerings and promotional discounts vary by location 
and rollout of services is heterogeneous. Certain services, say cable 
telephony or Verizon's FiOS service, are only available in specific locations. 
Service providers typically require that a potential consumer identifies a 
location before pricing information is revealed. This strategy substantially 
reduces market transparency and makes it nearly impossible to 
systematically compare prices across locations. Some general patterns are 
visible from table 1. Comcast, Time Warner Cable, and Cox 
Communications, the three largest cable multiple system operators (MSOs), 
do not (yet) offer mobile services and thus are at best competing in the 
market for triple play bundles. None of these companies has deployed voice 
services throughout their service territories. Thus, in many areas they 
effectively compete only in the video and internet bundle market. The 
RBOCs SBC and Verizon have a strong presence in local and long distance 
voice markets as well as wireless (SBC co-owns Cingular and Verizon 
partnered with Vodafone to form Verizon Wireless). On the other hand, with 
the exception of Verizon's fiber optic FiOS service, which is available only in 
a few locations, their networks are not yet capable of delivering high-quality 
video. Thus, each company has (temporarily) teamed up with a satellite 
service provider (SBC with DISH network, Verizon with DirecTV) and sells 
DBS service, but not as part of an integrated bundle. 
Given the many choice options in basic service options, bundled prices 
typically give a discount on the total price of the individual services, 
contingent upon the purchase of certain services. For example, Comcast 
grants a discount of USD 10.00-15.00 on its digital voice service, depending 
on whether a customer has signed up for either cable or internet, or both 
services. SBC customers are only eligible for discounts ranging from USD 2- 
USD 11 if they buy local and long distance voice services from the company. 
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Table 1 - Bundling options offered by major U.S. cable and telephone companies 
(price in USD as of October 1st 2005) 
Voice Video/entertainment Internet 
Service 
offering Local LD Standard cable 
Digital 
cable DVR
With 
cable/ 
phone
No 
cable/ 
phone
Mobile Bundle 
Comcast Cable (Southfield, Michigan) 
Individual 54.95 (Comcast Digital Voice) 45.99 
57.94-
96.99 9.95 42.95 57.95   
Preferred 44.95  X      
Preferred 44.95    X    
Preferred 39.95  X  X    
Cablevision (New York, New Jersey) 
Individual 34.95  39.90  44.95 49.95   
Double play 
(introductory) 29.95  39.90  29.95    
Double play 
(regular) 34.94  39.90  44.95    
Triple play 
(introductory) 29.95  29.95  29.95    
Triple play 
(regular) 34.95  39.90  44.95   
$20 
discount 
SBC Communications (Michigan) 
Individual 27.95-39.95 
15.00 
(flat) 
29.99-86.99 (depending 
on channel line-up, in 
partnership with DISH 
satellite network) 
14.95-24.99 
(various dial-
up and DSL 
plans with 
Yahoo) 
39.99-
69.99 
(Cingular) 
 
SBC Total 
Connections X X Sold separately X  X 
Save up 
to 11.00 
SBC 
Connections X X Sold separately   X 
Save up 
to 5.00 
SBC 
Connections X X Sold separately X   
Save up 
to 3.00 
All Distance 
Select X X Sold separately    
Save up 
to 2.96 
Verizon Communications (Michigan) 
Individual 34.95 (Voice Wing) 41.99 and up 
DSL: 14.95 
(768 kbps) – 
37.95 
(3 Mbps); 
FiOS: 34.95 
(3 Mbps)-
199.95 
(30 Mbps) 
39.99 
(450 
minutes)-
199.99 
(6000 
minutes) 
 
Verizon 
Freedom 
64.95 (local and 
long distance 
plus features) 
41.99 and up 14.95 and up  
Up to $6 
triple play 
discount 
Sources: Comcast: http://www.comcast.com/; Cablevision: http://www.optimum.com/; 
SBC: http://www.sbc.com/; Verizon: http://www22.verizon.com 
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Similarly, Verizon customers are eligible for discounts of up to USD 6 per 
month if they combine its local and long distance bundle ("Verizon 
Freedom") with internet access and DirecTV. Market transparency is further 
reduced by the widespread reliance on introductory special pricing offers 
and additional discounts for multi-year contracts. For example, in many 
areas Comcast offers high-speed internet access to new customers who are 
also Comcast cable subscribers for USD 19.99 per month, in contrast to 
USD 42.95 per month for undiscounted service to existing customers. 
Cablevision, a cable system in New York and New Jersey, offers 
aggressively priced double- and triple-play introductory bundles, under its 
"Optimum" brand. Each product in the bundles is priced at USD 29.95 for the 
first year with prices going up to the market rate thereafter (triple play 
customers will receive a USD 20 discount from the market price after year 
one). Although the introductory offer does not state what these prices might 
be, a large number of customers sign up per day. Cablevision is also running 
a trial providing a TiVo digital video recorder (DVR) with a wireless router, 
integrating a broadband backchannel into the bundle. In many of the 
bundled service agreements, penalties apply for premature cancellations in 
multi-year contracts, even if a customer only wants to drop one component 
of a bundle. All these observations support the theoretical conclusions that 
converged markets will be characterized by substantial price and service 
differentiation. 
  Differentiation and diversification 
Not all incumbent and potential new service providers have the resource 
base or the skills to offer fully bundled services. Terrestrial mobile service 
providers, satellite service providers and terrestrial broadcasters all are 
limited by the technical capabilities of the embedded network infrastructure 
and/or by financial constraints. Although digital technology and increased 
network capacity will relieve some of the exiting constraints, these 
companies will more likely be participants in triple- and quadruple-play 
strategies rather than orchestrators. Software developers, portals, 
equipment manufacturers and system integrators are likely to be in a similar 
position. At least for the foreseeable future these companies will either be 
integrated in the bundling strategies of incumbent fixed network providers or 
they will have to pursue more limited differentiation and diversification 
approaches. Despite their more limited scope, they can be effective 
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competitors and will exert significant competitive pressure in certain market 
segments. 
Terrestrial mobile service providers currently do not have the bandwidth 
deployed to offer a range of services comparable to those offered by fixed 
network service providers. However, as mobile networks are upgraded to 
2.5G and 3G capability and augmented with hotspots and perhaps WiMax a 
broader range of services may be offered. The United States does not have 
an explicit "3G strategy." Spectrum earmarked for 3G services will have to 
be cleared from present users and will not be auctioned until June 2006. 
However, mobile service providers may use their existing licenses to deploy 
3G services. Compared to Europe, the U.S. mobile industry pursued a more 
gradual transition to advanced mobile services. However, even if most of the 
network were upgraded, it is questionable whether mobile service providers 
could become the organizers of effective triple or quadruple play offers. The 
largest U.S. wireless service providers, Cingular and Verizon, are affiliated 
with RBOCs and folded into their bundling strategies. At present, their 
services are both marketed on a stand-alone basis and as part of a bundle. 
In any case, they will have to pursue strategies to reduce the decline in 
average revenues per user (ARPU). Similar developments are to be 
expected from the other national mobile service providers (Sprint/Nextel, and 
T-Mobile) and perhaps from the over 100 regional and local mobile voice 
service providers in the USA 10. 
Both mobile service providers affiliated with fixed networks and 
independent wireless operators pursue strategies of diversification, enabled 
by digitization and convergence. Some of these diversification efforts are 
organized as alliances and joint ventures. For example, between 2003-2005 
Sprint Nextel PCS expanded its mobile voice and data offerings with a 
spectrum of multimedia services. Customers of its Vision Multimedia Service 
have access to several radio services, TV, comic strips and games. Radio 
service includes several options, including 20 channels provided by satellite 
radio operator SIRIUS (SIRIUS Music), on-demand access to radio services 
such as public radio, and premium services. Television services include 
CNN, Fox Sports, The Weather Channel, and GoTV (delivering news from 
Reuters and AP, film reviews from Variety, etc.). Most recently, Sprint Nextel 
announced a partnership with Real Networks, whose Rhapsody Radio 
                     
10 According to FCC reports, by December 31st, 2004, 76 mobile service providers had over 
10,000 subscribers. Many smaller firms offered wireless service on a local and regional scale. 
See FCC (2005b, p. 3). 
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service will be available in streaming format for USD 6.95 per month. 
Verizon Wireless has introduced VCast in 60 metropolitan areas, streaming 
news, entertainment, sports and weather clips. At the time of writing, VCast 
offered a much narrower range of services than Sprint Vision Multimedia. 
Cingular also offers games for downloading and a (relatively narrow) range 
of news, financial information, weather, etc. via its MEdia Net. 
Digitization and convergence also offers market entry opportunities for 
new players, including portals like Yahoo or MSNBC; search engines like 
Google and software developers like Microsoft. Skype, developed by 
Sharman Networks, the designers of KaZaA, used its experience in peer-to-
peer software and networking to launch an internet-based voice service. 
Free between users running the Skype software on their computers or 
mobile devices, SkypeOut and SkypeIn offer services to the general user 
population. Following Skype's lead, Yahoo has introduced its Messenger 
service, offering free PC-to-PC calls. Similarly, Google offers Google Talk, 
as well combining calling and messaging services. These services pose 
considerable challenges for incumbent voice service providers, especially 
among young user groups. Some of these players are also deploying mobile 
access networks. For example, Google has announced that it would invest in 
free wireless broadband network covering San Francisco and Nintendo has 
announced that it will offer free wireless broadband access in McDonald's 
restaurants. Rapid innovation is also affecting home and business 
environments. One development is fixed-mobile integration. In enterprises, 
VoIP is used increasingly for internal communications. In the USA and 
Canada, fixed-mobile convergence for residential users is developing only 
slowly. However, interesting experiments are underway in home networking. 
For example, e-music retailer Napster also sells wireless hotspots to stream 
media content from a PC to a TV set 11. 
  Mergers and alliances 
For many advanced applications and services the value chain (or value 
network) has become much more complicated, not only involving more 
players (and thus more challenging coordination tasks), but also requiring a 
high degree of synchronicity to successfully launch an innovation. For 
example, mobile banking requires, among others, the collaboration of 
                     
11 See http://www.napster.com/using_napster/napster_in_your_living_room.html. 
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financial institutions, mobile service providers, equipment manufacturers, 
applications developers and perhaps portals. No individual company is likely 
to have the core skills necessary to solve all issues in-house. The 
requirement to coordinate the activities of several firms and their 
interdependencies raises complicated collective action problems, especially 
if a market is characterized by high uncertainty and financial risk. For 
example, network service providers may be reluctant to introduce new 
functionality before equipment manufacturers supply the necessary devices. 
However, equipment manufacturers may not be willing to produce devices 
until they see what the network can support. These problems can, at least to 
a certain degree, be overcome if firms collaborate in alliances and joint 
ventures. For example, NTT in Japan and SK Telecom in Korea played a 
leading role in the development of i-mode and Nate − the only two examples 
of successful mobile portals − coordinating the activities of equipment 
manufacturers, applications providers, and content providers to ascertain 
interoperability of the services. Mergers may also help overcome 
coordination issues. Both alliances and mergers may be pursued as active 
or defensive strategies. 
A full treatment of mergers in the U.S. communications markets would far 
exceed the scope of this paper. A few remarks in the light of the economics 
of convergence nonetheless seem appropriate. It was argued that 
convergence in complements may be a strong incentive to merge and 
enhance requisite skills and resources. Convergence in substitutes, which 
will tend to increase the intensity of competition, will create incentives to 
seek defensive vertical and horizontal mergers. NOAM (2003) has studied 
the degree of concentration in U.S. communications markets in great detail. 
On the whole, concentration in the industry declined until about 2000 and 
then started to increase again. The completed and pending mergers of the 
past few years have accelerated this general trend. In a series of mergers, 
four of the seven RBOCs were integrated into only two (SBC, and Verizon). 
AT&T and MCI, the two independent long distance service providers, are in 
the process of being absorbed by SBC and Verizon respectively. 
National wireless service providers are also consolidating: AT&T 
Wireless was taken over by Cingular, Sprint PCS is in the process of 
merging with Nextel, and the seventh and eight largest providers (Alltel and 
Western Wireless) are also merging. Once the pending mergers are 
consummated, nearly 75% of wireless subscribers will be served by a 
subsidiary of a wireline company, casting doubt on the much-touted vision 
that wireless will become a strong competitor to wireline service. It is more 
likely that service providers will emphasize the complementarities between 
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mobile and fixed services and pursue strategies of fixed-mobile integration. 
Presently a large number of wireless broadband service providers is entering 
the market (estimates range from 2,800 to 6,000 start-ups). Many of these 
experiments will fail and some of the successful service providers are likely 
to be taken over by the existing, larger conglomerates. NOAM's (2003) 
expectation that 2½ facilities providers will emerge in most markets is 
somewhat supported by these observations. An unresolved question is 
whether such a highly integrated industry will develop effective competition 
or patterns of manipulated competition. Given the high sunk and low 
incremental cost, the latter scenario is not a foregone conclusion, but if 
materializes, it will be at odds with the widely anticipated highly competitive 
convergence future. 
Table 2 - Selected recent alliances in the communications industries 
Participants Purpose 
SBC-Yahoo; Verizon-Yahoo; Bell South-
Yahoo 
Co-branding of (broadband) internet access 
SBC-EchoStar; Verizon-DirecTV Sale of satellite broadcasting service as 
component of quad-play strategy 
Comcast-TiVo Digital Video Recorder service, interactive 
advertising 
Comcast-T-Mobile Marketing alliance to offer T-Mobile HotSpot 
Wi-Fi internet service to Comcast customers 
Cingular-Dell; Sprint Nextel PCS-Palm Integration of advanced wireless services 
and hardware 
Comcast, Time Warner, Cox 
Communications, Advance/Newhouse-Sprint 
Nextel 
Alliance between various cable companies 
and Sprint Nextel to offer TV on mobile 
phones beginning in 2006 
SBC-Hewlett Packard; Cingular-Computer 
Associates; Bell South-Air2Web 
Business and enterprise solutions 
Sprint Nextel PCS-Real Networks; Sprint 
Nextel PCS-SIRIUS; Verizon-MSN 
Mobile broadcasting and streaming content 
Sun Microsystems-Google Cross-distribution of software 
Microsoft-Yahoo Integration of instant messenger services 
Mergers have also re-shaped other segments of the industry. Most 
prominently, the merger between AOL and Time Warner was seen as the 
logical response to convergence. Years later, it is evident that the merger, at 
least in its initial conception, failed to meet its expectations. Earlier attempts 
to create multimedia empires by Vivendi Universal also did not succeed, 
although for different reasons. Nevertheless, information technology 
companies have adopted strategies to expand into media and media 
companies to expand into the internet. For example, News Corporation 
recently acquired MySpace.com, giving it access to a social network of 33 
million people online. 
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The last few years have seen a plethora of alliances and joint ventures. 
Table 2 summarizes a selection of recent partnerships and their main 
purpose. Keeping an accurate track of these activities is nearly impossible 
as the beginning of collaboration is usually announced widely whereas its 
demise is concealed. It is also difficult to assess the success of alliances in a 
systematic fashion. Compared to the size and likely impact of mergers, the 
above alliances look like more limited and narrowly targeted activities. 
Some, like the alliances between RBOCs and DBS service providers, are 
likely to be temporary and may be abandoned once the carriers have 
upgraded their own terrestrial networks. At that point in time, they may just 
contract for content directly. Several recent agreements, for example, 
between Verizon, Disney and Starz, all point in that direction. Contractual 
models are also likely to develop for short episodes to be viewed at mobile 
phones. Such mobisodes are developed by the MTV Networks division of 
Viacom, Disney, and Warner Brothers. 
  Summary and outlook 
Convergence is a reality, but it has shortcomings as an organizing lens to 
strategize and theorize the present and future of communication industries. 
Early views of convergence anticipated an amalgamation of the formerly 
separate voice, data, audio and video segments into one industry. Such 
forecasts tacitly, but erroneously assumed that technological convergence 
propelled by digitization, higher processing power of computers and higher 
bandwidth, would inevitably lead to market and organizational convergence. 
Whereas such developments do occur, they unfold in more multi-faceted 
ways than commonly expected. Moreover, the effects of convergence on 
competition are not unanimously positive, as earlier analyses seemed to 
suggest. Other things equal, convergence in substitutes will intensify 
competition, but convergence in complements are likely to reduce it. As both 
processes unfold in parallel, it is difficult to predict the overall effect of 
convergence. Moreover, the economics of advanced communication 
networks and applications work against full convergence. Most importantly, 
firms facing high upfront and low incremental costs will have to differentiate 
their technology platforms, applications and services to be able to price 
discriminate and recover the initial investment. 
As the empirical evidence presented in this paper illustrates, firms have 
adopted a broad range of responses – including bundling, differentiation, 
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mergers and the formation of alliances – with complicated effects on the 
organization of the communications industries. There is strong evidence that 
the market has undergone a bifurcation: on the one hand, convergence does 
integrate the technological basis and allows more integrated offerings; at the 
same time, the availability of service and pricing packages is highly 
fragmented and differentiated. The markets for advanced communications 
services, while they offer a high degree of flexibility, have at the same time 
lost transparency. This may be a temporary phenomenon and vanish once 
services will be deployed on a more ubiquitous basis, but this is by no 
means certain. The opportunities to benefit from convergence are 
asymmetrically distributed. Cable companies and telephone companies are 
presently best positioned and seem poised to take advantage of triple and 
quadruple play offerings. However, the network infrastructure of telephone 
companies needs major upgrades to be capable of delivering video on 
demand services. Cellular wireless service providers, broadcasters, and 
satellite service providers face even more significant hurdles before they 
may offer a broader range of services. Wireless broadband is presently a 
booming market, but the economics of this sector are more risky than often 
assumed. Nevertheless the sector seems to have an important role to play 
on the edges of the communications infrastructure (BAUER, DENG, LAI & 
JI, 2005). Powerline communications may add an additional platform; but are 
currently only available on a limited basis. Their main strategy is likely to 
emphasize diversification and differentiation. 
Technological convergence has created many opportunities for new 
service providers to enter the market for communications services. Among 
them are numerous VoIP providers, such as Vonage or Skype, which are 
viable as long as they can get access to broadband platforms. Information 
technology companies like Google, Yahoo and Microsoft have also sought to 
enter the market for communications services and are winning a growing 
share of it. The telephone companies, at least in the long run, will face 
increasing price pressure in some traditional voice market segments (they 
will probably remain dominant suppliers in smaller local markets). Triple play 
strategies are thus a critical survival strategy. Cable service providers 
managed to overcome the problems of a mature and saturated market for 
entertainment services with broadband internet access. Multimedia services, 
such as interactive games could be seen as the next source of revenues 
once internet access prices, which have remained relatively high, start to 
decline. As a result of the economics of convergence, the emerging market 
environment will be differentiated and market transparency may be low, at 
least initially. While consumers will benefit from a broad range of choices, 
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they will also face certain costs of diversity, such as switching and search 
costs. Overall, convergence is transforming market boundaries and industry 
organization. It is also enabling new services and creates extraordinary 
opportunities for differentiation. Convergence has both competition-
enhancing and competition-reducing effects. Its impacts unfold in ways that 
often deviate from early expectations, assuring an exciting and challenging 
future for the industry. 
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